Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-38
September 2007
FORTHCOMING 1 ALBANY GOVERNMENT L. REV.

(2008)

JUSTICE SOUTER:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW’S EMERGING EGALITARIAN

Professor Rick Hasen
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network (SSRN) electronic library at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017881

Preliminary Draft September 2007. Please do not cite or quote without permission
Forthcoming, 1 ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW (2008)

JUSTICE SOUTER:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW’S EMERGING EGALITARIAN
RICHARD L. HASEN*
INTRODUCTION
As Supreme Court Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer voted
repeatedly to uphold campaign finance laws over the years, they developed an
interesting division of labor: Justice Breyer advanced egalitarian campaign
finance theories in concurring opinions1 and scholarly writings,2 while Justice
Souter would write majority opinions purporting to harmonize the Court’s ever
more deferential approach in the area with the Court’s older precedents.3 I had
suspected for some time that Justice Souter took this latter approach (rather than
joining in Justice Breyer’s views) in order to keep Justice O’Connor’s crucial fifth
vote in these cases.4
Justice O’Connor’s retirement and replacement with Justice Alito has
brought a shift in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence toward
deregulation,5 relegating Justices Souter and Breyer (along with Justices Ginsburg
and Stevens) to the minority. This shift to the minority has freed Justice Souter
to some degree to express his own views of the appropriate balance between the
First Amendment and other interests in the campaign finance cases (though he
still may be tempering his own views somewhat to remain consistent with his
earlier opinions). His recent dissenting opinion in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to
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William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I filed a
pro bono amicus brief with Professor Richard Briffault supporting the government’s position in
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007). The brief is
available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/wrtl-briffault-hasen-amici.pdf. Thanks to Dan
Ortiz for useful comments and suggestions. I appreciate the opportunity to write an essay for the
introductory issue of this new student-edited law journal.
1
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399-405 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
2
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
ch. 4 (Speech) (2005).
3
See infra Part I.
4
See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 32 n.7 (2004).
5
See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), draft available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003922.
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Life6 (“WRTL”) is the clearest exposition yet of Justice Souter’s jurisprudence in
the area, unencumbered by the need to capture a fifth vote. It is a glimpse into
what the Court’s jurisprudence might have looked like had the President
appointed someone in Justice Souter’s mold rather than a more conservative
Justice to replace Justice O’Connor.
As this Essay argues, Justice Souter’s jurisprudence as expressed in WRTL
demonstrates an emerging egalitarian view of campaign finance law. It is a view
that is broadly consistent with Justice Breyer’s “participatory self-government”7
rationale for campaign finance regulation but more deferential to legislative
branches about the means of achieving political equality. Though there were
elements of egalitarianism in Justice Souter’s earlier opinions, WRTL goes
further. But the Justice’s egalitarian ideas are not yet fully formed, and there is
room for questioning some of his implicit arguments and assumptions.
Part I of this Essay describes Justice Souter’s campaign finance views
expressed in cases while Justice O’Connor remained on the Court. Part II turns to
Justice Souter’s freer approach in WRTL. It first gives relevant background about
the WRTL case. It then describes Justice Souter’s views in dissent, which sets
forth a view of the government’s compelling interest in promoting “democratic
integrity.” It then argues that the “democratic integrity” interest, though couched
in some anticorruption language, actually expresses a nascent egalitarian
approach to campaign finance regulation. The Part concludes by noting that,
unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Souter has been insufficiently attentive to the
problem of incumbency protection in campaign finance regulation. In addition,
Justice Souter has yet to fully explore three issues in his emergent egalitarian
approach related to (1) his critique of total campaign spending; (2) his views on
the connection between campaign spending and public cynicism about the
political process; and, most importantly, (3) his treatment of labor unions.

I.
JUSTICE SOUTER’S PRE-WRTL CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE
Without going through all the jurisprudential twists and turns,8 it is
enough to note that the Supreme Court’s modern campaign finance jurisprudence
6

FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2687-2705 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“WRTL”).
7
See Hasen, supra note 4, at 44 (describing the “participatory self-government” rationale put
forward by Justice Breyer).
8
For details see id. at 35-46, Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social
Science and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law after Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849
(2007) (on Randall), and Hasen, supra note 5 (on WRTL). The next few paragraphs are drawn
from Hasen, supra note 5.
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traces to the Court’s 1976 opinion in Buckley v. Valeo.9 In Buckley, the Court
established that the amounts of campaign contributions could be limited to
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption, but that limits on spending
money could not be justified by an anticorruption interest (because of the lack of
evidence that independent spending could corrupt candidates) or on equality
grounds (because doing so would be “wholly foreign” to the First Amendment).
The Court declared that limits on the amount of contributions only “marginally”
restricted First Amendment rights and were therefore subject to lower
congressional scrutiny, while spending limits more directly limited speech and
were therefore subject to strict scrutiny.10
Since Buckley, the Court’s jurisprudence has swung like a pendulum
between periods of Court skepticism of campaign finance regulation and Court
deference to Congressional and state judgments about the need for such
regulation. The period before Justice O’Connor’s retirement was marked by the
greatest Court deference, as demonstrated by four cases I have dubbed the “New
Deference Quartet.”11
Though it may be tempting to consider the Supreme Court’s 2003 opinion
in McConnell v. FEC12as the most important of the New Deference cases, that
honor more properly belongs to Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,13 a
case whose majority opinion was authored by Justice Souter. True, McConnell
was the longest opinion in Supreme Court history14 and concerned the most
important piece of federal campaign finance legislation in a generation, the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA,” or “McCain-Feingold” for
its two primary Senate sponsors).15 But McConnell, whose key majority opinion
was co-authored by Justices O’Connor and Stevens,16 merely applied the New
Deference approach of Justice Souter in Shrink Missouri and in two other cases
he authored to uphold the key portions of BCRA against a facial constitutional
challenge. Doctrinally and conceptually, McConnell broke little new ground.
Shrink Missouri, however, changed the tone and jurisprudence of the
Court’s campaign finance cases. In Shrink Missouri the Court “(1) ratcheted
9

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26, 46-49.
11
See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure
Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 891 (2005) (discussing the “New
Deference Quartet” of Supreme Court cases).
12
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
13
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
14
DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN AND RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS
892 (3d ed. 2004).
15
116 Stat. 81.
16
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer each wrote majority opinions for the Court on other
aspects of BCRA challenged in McConnell.
10
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down the level of scrutiny applicable to contribution limit challenges; (2)
expanded the definition of ‘corruption’ and ‘the appearance of corruption’
necessary to sustain contribution limits; (3) lowered the evidentiary burden for a
government defending campaign contribution limits; and (4) created a very
difficult test for those challenging a contribution limit as unconstitutionally
low.”17
Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Shrink Missouri18 concomitantly
moved strongly toward deference while professing fidelity to Buckley and its
anticorruption rationale. The opinion mentions Buckley 53 times and purports to
be a mere “application” of Buckley’s principles. But whether one agrees with the
result in Shrink Missouri or not, it is hard to argue with Justice Thomas’s view in
his dissent that Shrink Missouri greatly expanded Court deference well beyond
the Buckley standard.19 It was left to Justice Breyer in a concurring opinion
(joined only by Justice Ginsburg) to advance an egalitarian rationale for the
Court’s deference, and to profess that Buckley’s statement rejecting equality as a
compelling interest to justify campaign finance regulation could not be taken
seriously.20
In two post-Shrink Missouri cases decided before McConnell, Justice
Souter took the same approach as he had in Shrink Missouri, professing
adherence to precedent while expanding the scope of Court deference to
legislative action. In Colorado Republican II,21 Justice Souter wrote an opinion
for the Court upholding a limit on the amounts that political parties may spend in
coordination with their candidates for federal office. Federal law treats such
coordinated spending as equivalent to a contribution. The opinion, relying on
Buckley and Shrink Missouri, upheld the measure on anticorruption grounds and
as necessary to prevent circumvention of individual campaign contribution limits.
In FEC v. Beaumont,22 a 2003 case, Justice Souter considered for the first
time the constitutional question of limitations on corporate election-related
spending. The Court had addressed corporate limits in candidate elections many
times before Justice Souter joined the Court. In 1986, the Court had held in FEC
17

See Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and “The Thing That Wouldn’t
Leave,” 17 CONSTITUTIONAL COMM. 483, 485 (2000).
18
528 U.S. 377.
19
Id. at 420-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
20
Id. at 399-405 (Breyer, J., concurring). Shrink Missouri is also significant for Justice Thomas’s
dissent, where he first set forth his strong deregulatory view of the campaign finance cases. See
[citation to be added to my forthcoming First Amendment Center essay of Justice Thomas’s
campaign finance jurisprudence].
21
Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 433 U.S.
431 (2001).
22
539 U.S. 146 (2003).
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v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (“MCFL”)23 that ideological corporations that
take no corporate or union funds must be exempted on First Amendment grounds
from laws limiting corporate independent spending in elections. But in a 1990
case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court held that Congress
could limit spending by for profit corporations because of the “corrosive and
distorting” effects of corporate wealth on the political process. Corporations could
use a separate segregated fund (or political action committee, more commonly
known as a “PAC”) to advance their election-related goals.24
In Beaumont, Justice Souter wrote an opinion for the Court holding even
ideological corporations entitled to the MCFL exemption for corporate spending
could be barred from making any campaign contributions to candidates.25 The
ruling was in tension not only with MCFL but with the 1978 Bellotti v. First
National Bank of Boston26 case, which held that the government may not limit
corporate spending in relation to ballot measure campaigns. Bellotti strongly
suggested corporate free speech rights are as strong as an individual’s rights, a
point Beaumont appears to reject. Justice Souter wrote in Beaumont that
“corporate contributions are furthest from the core of political expression, since
corporations’ First Amendment speech and association interests are derived
largely from those of their members, and of the public in receiving information. A
ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of corporations
free to make their own contributions, and deprives the public of little or no
material information.”27
In the last of the New Deference cases, McConnell v. FEC, the Court
applied these New Deference precedents and the revisionist reading of Buckley to
uphold the “soft money” and “issue advocacy” provisions of BCRA.28 In
upholding BCRA’s issue advocacy provisions, discussed more fully in the next
section, McConnell reaffirmed and strengthened Austin’s holding and extended it
to labor unions.
Though Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion in Shrink
Missouri and Beaumont, the Chief’s views changed in his last years on the Court,
and at oral argument in McConnell he suggested his earlier vote in Austin in favor
of the government a mistake.29 Thus, keeping Justice O’Connor’s vote, a justice
23

479 U.S. 238 (1986).
494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990).
25
539 U.S. at 163-64.
26
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
27
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161 n.8 (citation omitted).
28
539 U.S. 146.
29
McConnell v. FEC, Transcript of Oral Argument, Sept. 8, 2003, available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1674/argument/ (statement of Chief Justice
Rehnquist) (“I think one of the -- one of the dubious things about Austin is one of the things it
24
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whose positions on the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation have
vacillated over the years,30 became crucial. I suspected that the growing
disconnect and incoherence31 of the Court’s New Deference cases resulted from
Justice Souter (and then later Justice Stevens, co-author of the McConnell opinion
with Justice O’Connor) trying to keep Justice O’Connor’s vote by purporting to
apply existing precedent rather than expand it. As we shall see, Justice Souter’s
dissenting opinion in WRTL provides some support for this theory.

II.
JUSTICE SOUTER’S “DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY” AS NASCENT
EGALITARIANISM
A.

Background on WRTL32

To understand the dispute in WRTL we must begin with the 1974
Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).33 In FECA,
Congress sought to impose limits on any spending “relative to a clearly identified
candidate [in federal elections]”34and to require “‘[e]very person [above a certain
dollar threshold] . . . who makes contributions or expenditures’ . . . ‘for the
purpose of . . . influencing’ the nomination or election of candidates for federal
office”35 to disclose the source of such contributions and expenditures. The
Supreme Court in Buckley viewed both of these statutes as presenting problems of
vagueness; people engaging in political speech might well not know if the statutes
cover their conduct.36 Vague statutes violate the Due Process Clause,37 and are a

relied on was the fact that the corporation’s members or did not -- or owners did not necessarily
represent a large amount of public opinion, and it seemed to me, I voted in the majority, but it
seemed to me since then that that’s the whole purpose of the First Amendment is to allow people
who perhaps don't have much in the way of public opinion try to change public opinion.”).
30
LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 14, at 952.
31
I trace the incoherence in Hasen, supra note 4 (discussing the “new incoherence” of
McConnell); Hasen, supra note 8 (discussing the “newer incoherence” of Randall); and Hasen,
supra note 5 (discussing how Court in WRTL goes “beyond incoherence”).
32
For more comprehensive view, see Hasen, supra note 5, from which the next few paragraphs
draws. See also Richard Briffault, WRTL II: The Sharpest Turn in Campaign Finance’s Long
and Winding Road, 1 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. ___ (2008).
33
88 Stat. 1263.
34
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 (citing § 608(e)(1) of FECA).
35
Id. at 77 (citing section 434(e) of FECA).
36
Id. at 42-44, 76-78.
37
Id. at 77.
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special concern when the danger of chilling First Amendment rights of free
speech and freedom of association come into play.
In order to save both statutes from unconstitutional vagueness, the Court
construed them as reaching only “communications that in express terms advocate
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”38 The Court explained that
such express advocacy required explicit words “of advocacy of election or defeat,
such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’
‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ [or] ‘reject.’”39 So construed, the Court still struck down
the spending limits as violating the First Amendment,40 but it upheld the
disclosure requirements.41
Buckley left unregulated by FECA advertisements intended to or likely to
influence the outcome of an election but lacking words of express advocacy. Such
advertisements became known as “issue advocacy,” even though the prime issue
at stake in many of these advertisements was the election or defeat of a candidate.
Thus, an advertisement lacking express advocacy but criticizing Senator Smith in
the weeks before the election was not subject to disclosure under FECA, and
could be paid for with corporate or union funds, and is subject to no contribution
limits. The conduct escapes FECA because the advertisement ends with
something like, “Call Smith and tell her what you think of her Medicare plan”
rather than “Defeat Smith.”
Sham issue advocacy became a major electioneering force in the 1990s.42
BRCA sought to regulate sham issue advocacy through a new “electioneering
communications” test. Under BCRA, corporations and labor unions may not
spend general treasury funds (but may spend PAC funds) on “electioneering
communications,” just like corporations cannot spend general treasury funds on
express advocacy under Austin. An electioneering communication “encompasses
any broadcast, cable or satellite communication that refers to a candidate for
federal office and that is aired within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a
38

Id. at 44; see also id. at 80 (construing the term “expenditure” to have the same meaning in
Section 434(e) as the Court earlier construed it in Section 608(e) of FECA).
39
Id. at 44 n.52.
40
Id. at 48-49.
41
Id. at 80-81.
42
Individuals, political parties, interest groups, labor unions, and corporations spent as much as
$150 million in 1996 on such advertisements. DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY DURING
THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 3 (Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr. Report Series No. 16, 1997), available at
http://www.appc.penn.org/pub.htm. The figure climbed to at least $275 million during the 1998
election. Jeffrey D. Stanger & Douglas G. Rivlin, Issue Advocacy Advertising During the 19971998 Election Cycle, at http://appcpenn.org/issueads/report. htm. The number reached $509
million for the 2000 election cycle. See Issue Advocacy in the 1999-2000 Election Cycle, at
http://www.appcpenn.org/issueads/1999-2000issueadvocacy.pdf, at 4. See also McConnell, 540
U.S. at 127 n.20.
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federal election in the jurisdiction in which that candidate is running for office.”43
Thus, under section 203 of BCRA,44 a corporation or union could not use treasury
funds to pay for a television advertisement broadcast shortly before the election
criticizing Senator Smith by name for her lousy Medicare plan.
BCRA’s electioneering communications test solved the vagueness
problem, but it introduced a potential problem of overbreadth. An advertisement
might not be intended or likely to affect the outcome of the election, and still the
advertisement would fall within the bright line electioneering communications
test of BCRA section 203. For example, a television advertisement that a
corporation would like to run shortly before the election urging the President
running for reelection to intervene in a labor dispute could not be paid for with
general treasury funds.
In McConnell v. FEC, plaintiffs argued that section 203 was
unconstitutionally overbroad because it captured too much so-called “genuine
issue advocacy.”45 The three lower court judges hearing McConnell devoted
many pages and considerable effort to the overbreadth question.46 The Supreme
Court majority opinion in McConnell nonetheless devoted only a single paragraph
to this issue, rejecting the argument that the statute was overbroad.47 McConnell
left open the question whether a corporation or union could bring an “as applied”
challenge to BCRA section 203 by proving that a broadcast advertisement the
entity wished to pay for from its general treasury funds was a “genuine issue
advertisement” and therefore not subject to BCRA’s restrictions. The “as
applied” question returned to the Court in the WRTL case.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. “is a nonprofit, nonstock ideological
advocacy corporation” recognized as tax exempt by the Internal Revenue
Service.48
In late July 2004, WRTL began running a few television
advertisements in Wisconsin opposing the Senate filibuster of some federal
judicial nominations and urging voters to “Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl
and tell them to oppose the filibuster.”49 Two days later, WRTL filed suit in
federal court seeking a declaration and an injunction that it could run the ads and
pay for them from its general treasury funds as “genuine issue ads,” despite the
fact that Senator Feingold was running unopposed in a primary in mid43

WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2660 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A).
2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2) (2000 ed. Supp IV).
45
The following few paragraphs are drawn from Hasen, supra note 4, at 53-56.
46
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 367-73 (D.D.C.) (Henderson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003); id. at 610-39, 71952 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring); id. at 792-99, 890-918 (Leon, J., concurring).
47
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696.
48
WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2660.
49
Id.
44
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September.50 WRTL did not want to use its PAC funds to pay for the ads, and it
could not take advantage of the MCFL exemption for ideological corporations
because the organization took over $315,000 in donations from for-profit
corporations to pay for the ads.51
The case went to the Supreme Court twice. First, the Court unanimously
held that the issue whether there could be as applied challenges to BCRA section
203 was not decided in McConnell.52 On remand, the three-judge district court
split 2-1, holding that WRTL was entitled to an as applied exemption because,
looking only at the face of the ad and not the political context, the ad was not
necessarily an election-related ad (but instead about the “issue” of filibustering
judicial nominees).
The FEC and congressional intervenors appealed, giving the Supreme
Court a second chance to hear the case. The Court split three ways. Three
Justices (Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas) took the
position that Austin and McConnell were wrongly decided and should be
overturned, meaning that could WRTL not only pay for these ads from its
treasury funds, but that corporations and unions could pay from such funds for
any election-related advertisements, including those containing express
advocacy.53 Chief Justice Roberts and Alito cast the controlling votes in what the
Court referred to as the “principal opinion.” They declined to reach the facial
constitutional questions reached by Justice Scalia, holding instead that WRTL
was entitled to an “as applied” exemption for its ads. The principal opinion set
forth a very generous test for future as applied challenges to BCRA section 203—
an ad gets the exemption unless a court concludes, without looking at the political
context, that it is “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”54
Four Justices (Justice Souter, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and
Stevens) dissented, believing that WRTL’s ads, viewed in context, were
indistinguishable from the kinds of advertising the Court in McConnell held it
was permissible to regulate through a corporate PAC requirement in BCRA
section 203.55
B.
Justice Souter on Campaign Finance Regulation and “Democratic
Integrity”
50

WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2661.
WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2697 (Souter, J., dissenting).
52
FEC v. WRTL, 546 U.S. at 412.
53
Id. at 2674-2687 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
54
Id. at 2667.
55
Id. at 2687-2705 (Souter, J., dissenting).
51
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The first three parts of Justice Souter’s dissent in WRTL lay out in detail
Justice Souter’s general views about the constitutionality of campaign finance
regulation. In these parts, Justice Souter sets forth the interests that campaign
finance law is meant to protect and the problems with the current system. This
discussion reveals the less adulterated views of Justice Souter, unencumbered by
the need to keep Justice O’Connor happy.
Justice Souter begins his dissent by stating that the “significance and
effect” of the Court’s judgment “turn on three things: the demand for campaign
money in huge amounts from large contributors, whose power has produced a
cynical electorate; the congressional recognition of the ensuing threat to
democratic integrity as reflected in a century of legislation restricting the electoral
leverage of concentrations of money in corporate treasuries; and [McConnell],
declaring the facial validity of the most recent Act of Congress in that tradition, a
decision that is effectively, and unjustifiably, overruled today.”56
The Justice follows this introduction with a litany of facts to show the
important role that money for campaign advertising plays in modern campaigns.
Among the facts he recites are that in the 2004 campaign, more than half of the
two principal candidate’s expenditures went to pay for advertising;57 that more
than $2 billion was spent in the 2005-06 election cycle on television advertising, a
record for a non-presidential contest;58 that 2008 presidential candidates had
already raised over $150 million 18 months before the general election;59 that the
eventual presidential nominees are expected to raise $500 million each, “about
$680,000 per day over a 2-year election cycle;”60 and that over $4 billion was
spent on state and federal elections during the 2004 election cycle.61 A footnote to
this section describes issues related to increased fundraising pressures in state
judicial elections, not directly at issue in WRTL. It describes a poll of business
leaders, 90% of whom were at least “somewhat concerned” that campaign
contributions and political pressure could affect judicial decisionmaking.62
Justice Souter sees two problems with this spending: first, the wealthy
who spend or contribute more get more access to elected officials than others, and
second, the public knows about the unequal access, and this knowledge
undermines voter confidence in the electoral process. On the first point, Justice
Souter writes that the large demands of fundraising “assign power to the deep

56

Id. at 2687 (Souter J., dissenting).
Id. at 2688.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 2688 & n.2.
62
Id. at 2688 n. 2.
57
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pockets.”63 “What high dollar pragmatists…get is special access to the officials
they help elect, and disproportionate influence on those in power.”64 On the
second point, Justice Souter concludes that the candidates’ “demand for big
money” leads to “pervasive public cynicism,”65 citing pre-BCRA public opinion
polls showing Court distrust of politicians who take large campaign contributions.
Together, Justice Souter refers to these two interests as one in preserving
“political integrity,”66 “democratic integrity,”67 and “electoral integrity”68 (terms
he apparently uses interchangeably).
Justice Souter then singles out corporations as posing a special danger to
democratic integrity: “the same characteristics that have made them engines of the
Nation’s extraordinary prosperity have given them the financial muscle to gain
‘advantage in the political marketplace’ when they turn from core corporate
activity to electioneering.”69 He adds that it was “Congress’ judgment” that “the
same concern extends to labor unions as to corporations.”70 Justice Souter then
includes a lengthy recitation of the history of federal regulation of campaign
financing, with an emphasis on the problems Congress saw with corporate and
union election-related activity throughout the decades. Among the facts Justice
Souter notes in this lengthy recitation is that the AFC-CIO funded pre-BCRA
issue advocacy against first-term Republican House members through a 15-cent
per member, per month assessment of union members.71 Congress could
permissibly stop these practices in BCRA section 203, Justice Souter explains, to
further the Austin rationale by curbing the “corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the corporate form and
that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s
political ideas.”72
He concluded his lengthy discussion of the historical context as follows:
This century-long tradition of legislation and judicial precedent
rests on facing undeniable facts and testifies to an equally
undeniable value. Campaign finance reform has been a series of
reactions to documented threats to electoral integrity obvious to
63

Id. at 2688.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 2689.
67
Id. at 2687.
68
Id. at 2697.
69
Id. at 2689.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 2694.
72
Id. at 2696 (quoting Austin).
64
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any voter, posed by large sums of money from corporate and union
treasuries, with no redolence of “grassroots” about them. Neither
Congress’s decisions nor our own have understood the corrupting
influence of money in politics as being limited to outright bribery
or discrete quid pro quo; campaign finance reform has instead
consistently focused on the more pervasive distortion of electoral
institutions by concentrated wealth, on the special access and
guaranteed favor that sap the representative integrity of American
government and defy public confidence in its institutions From
early in the 20th century through the decision in McConnell, we
have acknowledged that the value of democratic integrity justifies
a realistic response when corporations and labor unions commit the
concentrated moneys in their treasuries to electioneering.73
The final part of Justice Souter’s dissent is predictable given the Justice’s
earlier opinions and votes. There, the Justice argues that the WRTL principal
opinion’s new “as applied” test is inconsistent with McConnell and effectively
overrules McConnell’s facial upholding of BCRA section 203.74 He believes the
WRTL ads are the prototypical type of ad that BCRA was meant to regulate.75
Justice Souter also predicts that the principal opinion will lead to the reemergence
of sham issue advocacy, as corporations and unions pay for ads that are likely to
affect the outcome of elections but that meet the new “no reasonable
interpretation” test.76
C.

Justices Souter as an Emerging Egalitarian

To be sure, one can read Justice Souter’s dissent as simply an extension of
the anti-corruption rationale of Buckley: Congress may permissibly limit
contributions to prevent the corruption of elected officials and the appearance of
corruption caused when the public believes that large donors “call the tune.”77
73

Id. at 2697 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2704 (“There is neither a theoretical nor a practical basis to claim that McConnell’s
treatment of § 203 survives.”).
75
Id. at 2698 (“it is beyond all reasonable debate that the ads are constitutionally subject to
regulation under McConnell”).
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Id. at 2705 (“After today, the ban on contributions by corporations and unions and the limitation
on their corrosive spending when they enter the political arena are open to easy circumvention,
and the possibilities for regulating corporate and union campaign money are unclear.”).
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Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 390 (“Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the
cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to
take part in democratic governance.”).
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For a few reasons, I believe Justice Souter’s dissent is more consistent with an
egalitarian rationale for campaign finance regulation.
First, BCRA section 203 concerns independent spending by corporations
and unions on election-related broadcast advertisements. Since Buckley, the
Court has viewed such independent spending as not presenting the same danger of
corruption as contributions to candidates. Though Justice Souter suggests in a
footnote to his dissent that corporate spending limits in candidate elections may
be justified on anticorruption grounds,78 he offers no sustained argument to back
it up, a point not lost on Justice Scalia.79 Simply put, rhetoric aside, Justice
Souter in his lengthy dissent provides no evidence supporting the claim that
independent spending serves anticorruption goals. His problem with such
spending must be elsewhere.
Justice Souter’s dissent is full of talk of “distortion”—even “pervasive
distortion”80—of the political process by corporate and union spending. This is
Austin “corrosion,” which occurs when corporations use their great wealth to
spend out of proportion with the views they represent in society—an egalitarian
notion.81 Indeed, Justice Souter does not argue that the “special access” large
donors (and presumably large independent spenders) purchase is a corrupt
transaction in a quid-pro-quo/“dollars for political favors” sense.82 Instead, he
claims that these donors (and spenders) have “disproportionate” influence over
the electoral process. It is this inequality of access (which ostensibly creates an
appearance of inequality83), rather than the sale of special favors, which Justice
Souter says drives public cynicism about the electoral process.
Justice Souter’s focus on total campaign spending also suggests there is
more going on here than simply a concern about corruption. After all, if a
candidate spent $10 million on an election having raised one million $10
contributions, the potential for corruption by donors appears minimal. But Justice
78

WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2692 n.7.
“The dissent asserts that Austin was faithful to Bellotti’s principles, to prove which it quotes a
footnote in Bellotti leaving open the possibility that independent expenditures by corporations
might someday be demonstrated to beget quid-pro-quo corruption. [Citation.] That someday has
never come. No one seriously believes that independent expenditures could possibly give rise to
quid-pro-quo corruption without being subject to regulation as coordinated expenditures.” Id. at
2678 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
80
Id. at 2697 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81
See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM
BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 111-14 (2003) (arguing that Austin embraces a political equality
rationale for campaign finance regulation).
82
Cf. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (“The
hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors”).
83
Hasen, supra note 11, at 909 (arguing that concerns about voter confidence may best be thought
of as raising an “appearance of inequality” concern).
79
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Souter’s view that the total amount of campaign spending is obscene and
dangerous to the “integrity” of American democracy shows an egalitarian impulse
to make campaigns less about money and more about ideas.
The Justice’s focus on total wealth highlights the point that many of the
arguments apply equally to large corporate and union spending in elections and to
large spending by wealthy individuals too.84 Justice Souter therefore might
support spending limits applied to individuals because such spending could cause
the same “pervasive distortion” of the political process if wealthy spenders’ views
would not proportionally represent the views of many voters. While Justice
Souter might respond that it is appropriate to limit this idea only to corporations,
because of the special way in which they can accumulate wealth, it is too late for
him to make that argument: labor unions do not accumulate wealth the way
corporations do (a point I return to in the next section); yet Justice Souter is
perfectly content with congressional action extending corporate limits to labor
unions. Moreover, some wealthy individuals no doubt gained much of their
wealth with the assistance of corporations, and therefore they too enjoy the
benefits of the corporate form and can translate their economic wealth into
political influence.
Together, I believe it is fair to characterize Justice Souter as an “emerging
egalitarian,” someone inclined to but still struggling with issues of using
campaign finance regulation to provide some measure of equality to the American
political system. We will have to see how Justice Souter hashes these issues out
in future cases. In the next section, I note some issues that need further
development in his egalitarian jurisprudence.
D.

The Next Iterations of Souter Egalitarianism

Labeling someone a “campaign finance egalitarian” is insufficiently
precise, as there are a great variety of equality approaches in the area.85 Justice
Breyer, for example, is a more firmly committed campaign finance egalitarian
than Justice Souter, having set forth is ideas on promoting political equality in his
84

Cf. WRTL, 127 S.Ct. at 2686-87 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the “wondrous
irony” that BCRA has let to the concentration of “power in the hands of the country’s wealthiest
individuals and their so-called 527 organizations, unregulated by § 203”).
85
For example, Professor Foley is concerned about unequal spending in the political process
because it is likely to have an unfair effect on electoral outcomes. See Edward B. Foley, EqualDollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204
(1994). My own work is concerned about unequal spending in the political process because it is
likely to have an unfair effect on legislative outcomes. See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons
for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 1 (1996).
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Shrink Missouri concurrence and in academic writings. In addition, there are
some important jurisprudential differences between them.
Justice Breyer’s “participatory self-government” objective argues that
there are important First Amendment interests on “both sides” of the political
equation and that a careful balancing of rights is necessary.86 He is willing to
defer somewhat to legislators, who have greater expertise in campaign finance
than judges. But he is wary that such laws might be means of incumbent selfprotection, and for this reason he urges closer scrutiny of campaign finance
laws.87
In contrast, Justice Souter believes more in deference to the legislature,
and seems relatively unconcerned about incumbent protection. In the New
Deference cases he authored, he brushes aside any concern about incumbency
protection. Justice Souter also seems less worried than Justice Breyer about
striking the right balance with the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Randall v. Sorrell88 illustrates the
difference in the approaches of the two Justices. Randall principally concerned
the question whether Vermont’s campaign contribution limits were too low.
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Chief Justice Roberts and Alito, concluded
that the amounts were too high, because there were “danger signs” the law was
aimed at protecting incumbents and because the measure was too restrictive given
the anticorruption goals it was purportedly trying to accomplish.89 Justice Souter,
in dissent, would have applied a much more deferential test for determining when
a campaign contribution limit is too low, holding that because the Vermont limits
were not “laughabl[y] low,”90 they were constitutional. As I have argued, it is
very difficult to justify the Vermont limits on anticorruption grounds; the better
reading of the Vermont legislature’s intent—and Justice Souter’s intent to uphold
the limits—is a commitment to equality in campaign finance fundraising and
spending.91
The two Justices also split on the expenditure limit question: Justice
Breyer wrote that Vermont’s candidate spending limits were unconstitutional
under Buckley;92 while Justice Souter would not have reached the question.93
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BREYER, supra note 2, at 48.
Id. at 149.
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126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006).
89
Id. at 2492 (plurality opn.).
90
Id. at 2514 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91
Hasen, supra note 887 (“It seems quite obvious that the real goal of the Vermont measure,
hidden from debate in order to comply with Buckley’s rejection of the equality rationale, was the
promotion of political equality.”).
92
Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491 (plurality opn.).
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Id. at 2511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Though Justice Breyer may well have tempered his opinions to keep the votes of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,94 looking at the Randall opinions on their
face, Justice Souter seems more committed to egalitarianism than Justice Breyer.
Justice Souter, even if he becomes a committed egalitarian, should
consider adopting some of Justice Breyer’s skepticism about legislatively-enacted
campaign finance law. After all, not all campaign finance measures will be
passed with the good government intentions of the prototypical New England
town meeting. A committed egalitarian should be wary of self-dealing disguised
as political reform.
In addition, Justice Souter should devote some attention to three other
issues under the “democratic integrity” approach.
1.
What’s Wrong with Large Total Spending? Return to the example I
gave in the last section of a candidate raising $10 million in one million $10
donations. Not only does this scenario not raise serious concerns about
corruption, it could well be something to celebrate from an egalitarian
perspective. Rather than going to a “fat cat” who can give $10 million to a
candidate, the candidate is able to raise a great deal from a large number of
modest contributions. It is this impetus toward the democratizing effect of small
donations that makes the rise of Internet fundraising so exciting from an
egalitarian perspective.
For this reason, Justice Souter’s concerns about total spending are
somewhat misplaced. In today’s busy world, in which many rational voters do
not devote much time to considering whom to vote for, candidates need to use
media such as television, radio, newspapers, direct mail, and the Internet, to reach
voters. Many of these means are going to be expensive, and an egalitarian
perspective that would decrease total spending runs the risk of not giving enough
resources for many voices to be heard in a vibrant debate over candidacies and
ballot measures. Seeking to limit total spending, in other words, does not hit the
target that egalitarians should aim for.
Justice Souter might respond that it is not the total amount of spending
that is itself objectionable; rather it is the demands that the high costs of
campaigns put on candidates to raise ever larger amounts of money. That is a fair
point, but it is not one that is attacked by going after total spending. Campaign
financing can promote egalitarianism in ways that do not decrease public
spending but decrease a candidate’s need to raise ever large funds. For example,
public subsidies for campaigns (perhaps tied to matching small donations) or free
air time for candidates required of broadcasters as part of their broadcast
94

Hasen, supra note 8, at 852 (“Competition arose in Randall to test the constitutionality of low
contribution limits as a rear-guard action by Justice Breyer to cling to the framework of Buckley v.
Valeo…”).
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obligations could help meet such needs. Indeed, I have argued that low
contribution and spending limits in Vermont could well be unconstitutional even
accepting the political equality rationale for regulation unless the state also
provides subsidies for vibrant political speech.95
2.
Is There Any Evidence to Support the Idea that Campaign Finance
Regulation Can Decrease Public Cynicism or Increase Voter Confidence in the
Electoral Process?
Justice Souter’s argument for “democratic integrity” is
premised not only on the “disproportionate” or “special” access afforded to large
campaign donors and spenders. He also believes that this disproportionate
spending leads to increased public cynicism and a decline in voter confidence in
Democratic government.
Though Justice Souter provides ample support for the proposition that
voters are cynical that large donors have disproportionate influence in
Washington, he provides no support for the proposition that campaign finance
laws such as BCRA decrease public cynicism about the political process (or at
least prevent a further slide in public confidence in the electoral process). The
social science evidence to date does not support the latter implied assertion in
Justice Souter’s work. Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie, for example, found
an increase in public cynicism after Congress passed BCRA.96 These authors
believe that outside factors, and not campaign finance regulation, drives public
cynicism about government.97
The lack of evidence of a connection between public attitudes and
campaign finance regulation is not fatal to Justice Souter’s position. It simply
suggests that the Justice should place more emphasis on the issue of
“disproportionate influence” and less on the appearance of inequality in crafting
his arguments in favor of regulation.
3.
What’s Wrong With Large Union Spending? Perhaps the least
satisfying portion of Justice Souter’s opinion is his treatment of the regulation of
labor unions. Labor unions amass funds by collecting dues from their members,
not through the use of a corporate form to engage in a for-profit enterprise. Yet
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in WRTL elides over the difference when he
cites the Austin distortion rationale in explaining the reason for regulating
corporations and then simply notes that it was “Congress’ judgment” that “the
same concern extends to labor unions as to corporations.”98 He also noted
95

Hasen, supra note 8, at 889.
Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance Law:
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 123 (2004).
97
Id.
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Congressional fears of “accumulated wealth” in the hands of labor unions as
prompting Congress to pass the Taft-Hartley Act, limiting union campaign
spending.99
To the extent that Justice Souter believes labor union spending is
objectionable because some unions are wealthy, he has an argument for limiting
spending by all wealthy individuals and entities, not just corporations and labor
unions. But the opinion zeroes in on corporations and unions (condemning their
“corrosive spending”100), and not all wealthy groups, without adequate
explanation about the dangers of labor unions.
Among the parade of pre-BCRA horribles chronicled by Justice Souter is
that “the President of the AFL-CIO stated that the bulk of its ads were targeted for
broadcast in districts represented by first-term freshman Republicans who…may
be defeatable, and the Senate committee found that the union used a $.15 per
member, per month assessment to finance issue ads that were clearly designed to
influence the outcome of the election.”101 Again, putting aside the great total
wealth of unions, it is difficult to see what is objectionable from an egalitarian (or,
for that matter, an anticorruption) perspective about this spending. Here is
collective action that should be celebrated: a large number of people have made
miniscule contributions collectively for political action. Political power is not
being driven by a few rich spenders: it is being driven by many people of modest
means banding together in an effective way. Justice Souter needs to provide a
much better explanation for what is objectionable about this spending.
Aside from an argument that spending by all wealthy individuals and
entities should be limited, the best argument an egalitarian might make for
regulating union spending is political expediency. For more than 50 years,
congressional limits on corporate and union spending have gone hand-in-hand. A
ruling striking down limits on union (but not corporate) election-related spending
could well lead Congress to lift the limits on corporate spending as well, a result
that may be worse than the status quo from an egalitarian perspective. It is not
clear if Justice Souter had this realpolitik in mind in crafting his WRTL dissent,
but the final product offers an unsatisfying explanation of the constitutional basis
for the regulation of union election-related spending.

CONCLUSION
Justice Souter may never again have an opportunity to write a majority
opinion in a campaign finance case in his tenure on the Court. But the Court’s
99
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experience in this area shows that its decisions have swung like a pendulum, and
the views of Justice Souter could well be picked up by a future Supreme Court
majority that either explicitly or implicitly accepts political equality arguments for
campaign finance regulation.
For this reason, Justice Souter should devote care to the further
development of his “democratic integrity” arguments for campaign finance
regulation. Justice Souter, more than any other Justice on the current Supreme
Court, has freed those who would craft campaign finance regulation in the name
of political equality from Supreme Court interference. Now, as his position
becomes the minority position on the Supreme Court, he can leave future
generations with a more coherent and compelling egalitarian rationale for sensible
campaign finance laws yet to be written.

